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REGULATING ADWORDS:
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN A MARKET
WHERE THE COMMODITY IS SPEECH
Alex W. Cannon ∗
All current forms of activity tend towards advertising and most
exhaust themselves therein. Not necessarily advertising itself, the
kind that is produced as such—but the form of advertising, that of
a simplified operational mode, vaguely seductive [and] vaguely
1
consensual.

I.

INTRODUCTION

We should be elated, we should be concerned, yet we should not
2
be surprised. Google can read our minds, tell us what we want to
purchase, assist us in fulfilling our most personal and closely guarded
desires, further our businesses, update us on current events, make
decisions for us, educate us, and keep us healthy. Some consumers
3
“can’t think of anything [they] don’t search for.” The aforementioned sentiments resonate throughout an eight-minute Internet
flash video made for the Museum of Media History entitled EPIC:
2014, which predicts that Google will merge with Amazon.com, TiVo,
Blogger, and various social networking tools to create the “Google
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1
JEAN BAUDRILLARD, Absolute Advertising, Ground-Zero Advertising, in SIMULACRA
AND SIMULATION 87, 87 (Shelia Faria Glaser trans., Univ. of Mich. Press 1994) (1981).
2
While this Comment primarily concerns Google, Inc., it uses “Google” not only
to refer to Google, Inc., but also to search engines in general.
3
DEBORAH FALLOWS, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, SEARCH ENGINE
USERS: INTERNET SEARCHERS ARE CONFIDENT, SATISFIED AND TRUSTING—BUT THEY ARE
ALSO UNAWARE AND NAÏVE 7 (Jan. 23, 2005), available at http://www.pewinternet.org
/pdfs/PIP_Searchengine_users.pdf (A study of search engine users found that
searchers turn to search engines “for need-to-know information [and] for trivia.”).
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4

Grid.” In EPIC co-creator Robin Sloan’s universe, the Google Grid
would be the most efficient information platform ever created—
allowing users to effortlessly consume and continuously produce in5
formation. As Sloan voices doubts that the events prophetically de6
picted in EPIC will ever come to pass, Google continues to assert its
7
dominance in the search engine market, expand its corporate appa8
ratus into new ventures, and increase its capital at an astonishing
9
rate. The more Google customizes its capabilities and increases its
convenience, the greater society’s dependence on Google could be10
come.
It is the best of times and it is the worst of times for consumers of
all stripes. By simply “googling” a product, the consumer has immediate access to a plethora of commodities made available by online
vendors. From locating sneakers to securing mortgages, Google acts
11
as a sophisticated concierge, or perhaps, more accurately, a sales assistant at a store whose shelf-space is unrestricted by the economic
12
limitations plaguing the brick-and-mortar crowd.
Whether the
searcher seeks goods, services, or information, Google makes suggestions and thereby directs the consumer to the most appropriate sup-

4

Robin Sloan, EPIC: 2014 (Museum of Media History 2004), http://epic.
makingithappen.co.uk/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2009).
5
Id.
6
Masha Gellar, The Demise of the Fourth Estate, IMEDIA CONNECTION, Feb. 7, 2005,
http://imediaconnection.com/content/5020.asp (last visited Jan. 13, 2009).
7
Steve Lohr, The Risks to Google’s Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2007, at C1. (“In September [2007,] Google’s share of Web searches in the United States was 67
percent . . . .”).
8
Google recently acquired advertising giant DoubleClick for $3.1 billion. Press
Release, Google, Google to Acquire DoubleClick (Apr. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/doubleclick.html. Not only does
this purchase give Google “sole control over the largest database of user information
the world has ever known,” but it also allows Google to “become the overwhelmingly
dominant pipeline for all forms of online advertising.” Senators Scrutinize Google’s Bid
for Ad Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at C4 [hereinafter Google’s Bid].
9
See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
10
Robin Sloan, Position Paper 1 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (hypothesizing that Google could someday create Google Vote, Google Census, Google FOIA, and Google Redistricting).
11
Perhaps in the case of Google’s sponsored results, Google acts more like a
concierge who takes kickbacks from local restaurants in exchange for directing
guests to their places of business.
12
See CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG-TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING
LESS OF MORE 1–10 (2006) (explaining how the low cost of reaching consumers transformed the marketplace from a one-size-fits-all model to a collection of decentralized
niche markets tailored for specialty consumers).
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plier. However, all this convenience comes at a price: Google’s services may be cost-free to the searcher, but the potential implications
to the searcher’s privacy and autonomy may be drastic. Google catalogues personal information about its users, keeps track of search results, and collects the search logs generated from individual user’s
14
queries. Furthermore, the U.S. government, through either its legislature or its judiciary, is doing little to restrict Google’s ability to
15
profit from deceptive or incomplete search results.
This Comment hopes to increase the dialogue surrounding
search engine regulation. Starting with the legal assumption that
16
where there is a wrong there should be a remedy, this Comment asserts that the judicial treatment of Google as a fully protected First
17
Amendment speaker is dangerous precedent. Google is an advertising machine, and as a publicly traded company its directors are obligated to increase the value of the organization by utilizing every tool
18
at its disposal to get consumers’ eyes on ads. In this respect, Google
does not express an opinion in the traditional context of the First
Amendment. Rather, by achieving a symbiotic balance between its

13

Google fulfills its duty via a trade secret algorithm trademarked as PageRank.
See Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115,
137 n.96 (2006); Google.com, Technology Overview, http://www.google.com/
corporate/tech.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2009) (describing the PageRank Technology).
14
See Gonzales v. Google Inc. 234 F.R.D. 674, 688 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that
Google must provide the Government with an index of its search results, but that the
individual search logs would be duplicative); see also Google.com, Google Privacy Policy, http://www.google.com/intl/en/privacypolicy.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2009)
(providing a full description of Google’s privacy policies and procedures). While privacy is not the primary concern of this Comment, it is important to note the vast
amounts of personal data Google aggregates because, if unchecked, Google could
readily abuse its position of power in the marketplace. But see Microsoft v. Google:
When Clouds Collide, ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 2008, at 69–70 [hereinafter Microsoft v.
Google].
15
See, e.g., Andrew Sinclair, Note, Regulation of Paid Listings in Internet Search Engines: A Proposal for FTC Action, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 353, 360–62 (2004); see also,
Google, Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C-03-5340, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 32450, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007).
16
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury.”). No doubt Chief Justice Marshall had the following legal maxim in mind: “ubi jus ibi remedium.”
17
See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007); Search
King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193, at
*12–13 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
18
See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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clients and its users, Google is able to garner massive profits.
Google’s corporate interests need to be weighed against societal interests such as informational reliability and informational autonomy.
Further, the traditional free-market checks disintegrate in light of
20
Google’s rather un-savvy users. The most visceral danger would be
to allow Google, with its ability to tactfully and discretely manipulate
consumers, unfettered power to subjectively control access to an im21
Finally, this Comment proposes that the
portant speech market.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) would be able to regulate Google’s
sponsored search results under the commercial speech doctrine.
Conceptualizing Google as a concierge service that generates
capital from selling advertising space provides a useful framework for
examining the role of the government in protecting consumers, private individuals, and commercial entities from abuse. Part II of this
Comment provides a brief history and overview of the law of search.
Also, using a recent study by the Pew Internet and American Life Pro22
ject, this Comment shows that user expectations are surreptitiously
undermined by Google’s placement of hits on its results page. Part
23
III compares the solutions proposed by Andrew Sinclair and Eugene
24
Volokh and discusses Google’s First Amendment limitations. Part
IV explains why Google’s service is commercial in nature and therefore should be regulated under the commercial speech doctrine. Fi25
nally, Part V applies the four-factor test from Central Hudson and its
progeny to Andrew Sinclair’s proposal for FTC regulation.

19

See Lohr, supra note 7; Posting of Miguel Helft to Bits Blog-NY
Times.com, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/google-shares-top-600/ind
ex.html?hp (Oct. 8, 2007, 16:11 EST). Google’s “$144 billion market value tops that
of Time Warner, Viacom, CBS, ad agency giant Publicis Groupe and the New York
Times Co. combined.” Michael Barber, Google: The David or Goliath of the Media World,
(2008), http://www.sitewire.net/newsletters/volume/3/issue/4/#googleplexed (last
visited Jan. 13, 2009).
20
See infra Part II.
21
This Comment does not take issue with Google, Inc.’s unofficial corporate
motto of “Don’t Be Evil.” See Lohr, supra note 7. However, judicial acquiescence to
the interests of a privately controlled, culturally defining tool presents a unique
threat to a democratic society.
22
FALLOWS, supra note 3.
23
Sinclair, supra note 15, at 369–73.
24
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000).
25
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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II. GENERAL BEWILDERMENT AND THE NEED FOR REGULATION:
SEARCHERS ARE CONFIDENT, UNINFORMED, AND LOYAL
Before the Internet became a ubiquity, the media were dominated by several large entities controlling nearly every aspect of
broadcast communication. This figurative, and sometimes literal,
monopoly imposed high entry costs for individual speakers as well as
corporations who desired to reach consumers. Essentially, major
media outlets served as a filter of speech—if the speaker’s message
was deemed fringe or otherwise unprofitable, then that person’s
speech was excluded from broadcast and the message would not
reach a broad audience. Early commentators predicted that the
Internet would “ameliorate the traditional mass-media bottleneck
26
and render moot the policy and legal debate that surround[s] it.”
When the majority of Internet users were erudite technophiles, the
27
World Wide Web was a bastion of free speech. Because every user
possessed the requisite navigational knowledge, the Internet seemed
poised to fulfill its promise as a techno-libertarian free speech uto28
pia.
29
But as the saying goes, “[t]he times they are a-changin’.” To30
day over 1.4 billion people worldwide use the Internet, with each
individual consuming goods and information. In many circumstances, people use message boards, wiki-technology, or HTML to
create their own Internet speech. This vast quantity of both Internet
users and Internet data presented a conundrum from a social science
perspective.
As the sheer density of information available online has skyrocketed, a user’s ability to efficiently traverse a decentralized network has

26

Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2008) (explaining
high-cost entry fees).
27
Id. at 1157 (“[C]ommentators urged courts and policymakers to grant a high
degree of protection to Internet speech.”).
28
See FALLOWS, supra note 3, at 4 (arguing that the social value of the free speech
may have been questionable: “In the earliest days of the Internet and search engines
. . . two of the most popular search topics were sex and technology.”).
29
BOB DYLAN, The Times They are A-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’
(Columbia Records 1964).
30
Miniwatts Marketing Group, Internet Usage Statistics (2008), http://www.
internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2009) (citing to information
published by Nielson Net Ratings) (finding that over seventy-three percent of the
North American population is online).

CANNON

(final)

2/7/2009 12:22:41 PM

296

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:291

31

diminished.
Internet users engaged in a binary game of Marco
Polo—blindly grasping for material that they could neither sort nor
recognize—and the search engines capitalized on this confusion. By
providing Internet users with a starting point, search engines greatly
increased the utility and social value of the Internet. As a testament
to the practicality of search engines, current statistics indicate that
32
“84% of Internet users have used search engines” and that “[o]n
33
any given day, 56% of those online use search engines.” Of all the
search engine companies, no single provider has been as successful as
34
Google. At the current pace, nearly 400 million people per month
35
start each Internet visit on Google.com. Google commands sixty36
four percent of all searches performed by Internet users, as compared to its closest competitor, Yahoo.com, which only maintains
37
thirteen percent of the market share. Like the broadcasting behemoths of the bygone era, Google is the primary bottleneck of our
38
current informational age. As professors Bracha and Pasquale have
stated, “The specter of control . . . over critical bottlenecks of informational flow threatens the openness and diversity of the Internet as
a system of public expression.”
Google has the power to exclude content or make an overnight
39
cultural sensation. Its tastemaker status is solidified by its simplicity,
and Google is widely revered for being the largest indexer of Internet
40
content, currently listing over eight billion web pages. In recognition of Google’s impressive societal leverage, businesses reward it with
tremendous advertising revenue; in 2006 Google generated $10.6 bil-

31

For an excellent discussion of the rise of search engine technology and its effect on society, see Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking
Ahead, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 201 (2006).
32
FALLOWS, Summary of Findings, in supra note 3, at i. “Some 84% of adult Internet
users . . . have used search engines to help them find information on the Web. Only
the act of sending and receiving email . . . eclipses searching in popularity . . . .” Id.
at 1.
33
Id. (“American Internet users pose about 4 billion queries per month.”).
34
See Lohr, supra note 7.
35
See Helft, supra note 19.
36
Microsoft v. Google, supra note 14, at 69.
37
Id.
38
Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 26, at 1172.
39
See, e.g., Video: Tay Zonday, Chocolate Rain (April 22, 2007), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=EwTZ2xpQwpA (as of January 13, 2009, 33,181,166 people,
roughly the population of Canada, had viewed Chocolate Rain).
40
FALLOWS, supra note 3, at 1.
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lion in advertising fees, representing a seventy-three percent increase
41
as compared to 2005.
A brief discussion of legislative policy will help frame the issue of
consumer protection under the Google regime. In 1996, Congress
42
passed the Telecommunications Act, recognizing that the “World
Wide Web [is] a valuable source of information and medium for the
exchange of ideas, the commercialization of Internet navigation
though private control of portals, gateways, browsers and search en43
gines poses new problems.” Congress drafted the Telecommunications Act with the intent to create a competitive market in informa44
tion technology by removing barriers to marketplace entry.
45
Ironically, the legislative goal of consumer protection missed the
mark, and as predicted by Walter G. Bolter, the Telecommunications
Act and its subsequent deregulation of the telecom markets did not
facilitate new entry but rather “permitted the aggregation[] of eco46
nomic power.”
A glance at the daily papers reveals that current
market conditions continue to teeter between monopoly and competition. A non-inclusive list of recent telecom mergers suggests that
the balance may soon tip in favor of monopoly: AT&T recently
merged with Media One; AOL merged with Netscape; Lycos merged
with USA Networks; US West and Qwest recently became one; and
Google recently acquired YouTube and added DoubleClick to its ad47
vertising arsenal. At least two commentators have suggested that the
market conditions in the years immediately following the Telecom48
munications Act indicated a monumental policy failure.
Where does this leave consumers? Does the average consumer
understand the broad ramifications for informational reliability
posed by the aggregation and centralization of the most culturally defining informational nexus since the Library of Alexandria? Do con41

See ANDREW GOODMAN, WINNING RESULTS WITH GOOGLE ADWORDS 21 (2d ed.
2008).
42
36 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
43
Jan H. Samoriski, Private Spaces and Public Interests: Internet Navigation, Commercialism and the Fleecing of Democracy, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 93, 94 (2000).
44
Id.
45
Congress enacted 47 U.S.C. § 253 to “ensure the continued quality of telecommunications services, and [to] safeguard the rights of consumers.” H.R. REP. NO.
104-458, at 126 (1996).
46
Walter G. Bolter, Trends in Communication: A Market and Policy Perspective, in
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: COMMON CARRIERS IN A COMPETITIVE ERA 87, 91 (1983).
47
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
48
Jeffery A. Eisenach & Randolph J. May, Communications Deregulation and FCC
Reform: Finishing the Job, in COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION AND FCC REFORM 2, 2
(Jeffery A. Eisenach & Randolph J. May eds., 2001).
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sumers expect Google to behave as an objective reference librarian
49
and, if so, what are the implications of Google’s AdWords program?
Ultimately, the question for policymakers is whether the government
should explicitly protect consumers’ expectations of objectivity in the
online domain.
A recent study undertaken by the Pew Internet & American Life
50
Project demonstrates that the vast majority of searchers are confi51
dent in their ability to retrieve relevant search results. On the one
hand, one could assume that search engines are performing with a
high level of reliability and accuracy; such an assumption is not in52
consistent with Google’s high market share. Perhaps, Google maintains its market power because users are genuinely satisfied with the
search results they receive. However, a closer examination of empirical data indicates that the majority of users lack a sufficient under53
standing of search engine practices: One of every six search engine
users are unable to distinguish between sponsored results and or54
ganic results. Furthermore, thirty-three percent of search engine
users who think that search engine results are fair and unbiased are
completely unaware of the distinction between results that are paid
55
for and those that are not. A comparison of search engine results to
a television broadcast, where every consumer can readily distinguish
56
“between TV’s regular programming and its infomercials,” strongly
suggests that the searcher’s sanguinity is inappropriate. This leaves
open the question of whether Google’s marketing minds, which divine search engine practices, could actively manipulate consumers by
instilling a false sense of security into their psyches.

49

AdWords is Google’s primary source of revenue. Ebay to Resume Advertising on
Google but Cuts Frequency, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2007, at C9. It allows a business to purchase specific keywords so that when a searcher enters the relevant keyword, the
business’s webpage appears as a sponsored result. Google.com, Google AdWords,
https://adwords.google.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2009).
50
FALLOWS, supra note 3.
51
Id. at 8 (“Some 92% of those who use search engines say they are confident
about their searching abilities.”).
52
Lohr, supra note 7.
53
FALLOWS, supra note 3, at 16–20.
54
Id. at 17. Sponsored results are the consequence of Google accepting payment
for placement on their results page. Generally sponsored results appear at the top
and on the right-hand-side of the results page. Organic results are the hits that are
generated by Google’s complicated search algorithm, are not paid for, and appear in
the center of the results page.
55
Id. at 15.
56
FALLOWS, Summary of Findings, in supra note 3, at ii.
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In 2001, Consumer Alert, a now defunct non-profit consumer
protection agency, filed a complaint with the FTC alleging that
57
search engines were behaving fraudulently. Consumer Alert stated
that search engines, instead of simply relying upon their respective
algorithms, were intermingling sponsored results with objective results and not providing adequate differentiation information that
would allow consumers to distinguish the advertisement from the or58
ganic. The FTC agreed. Upon Consumer Alert’s request, the FTC
investigated and responded not by demanding that search results be
clearer but by drafting a letter to search engine companies requesting
that “the use of paid inclusion [be] clearly and conspicuously ex59
plained and disclosed.” Because of the FTC’s perfunctory regulatory effort, it is unsurprising that users are still generally unable to
60
distinguish between the two.
As if consumers were not already David to Google’s Goliath, another more psychologically subtle issue compounds the user confusion problem: brand loyalty. In NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND
BULLIES, Naomi Klein suggests that the grail of modern marketing is
61
the inducement of brand loyalty. In her view, corporate marketers
begin conditioning consumers’ minds when they are young. Their
mission is as multifarious in design as it is easy to execute—to create a
62
loyal consumer for life. While this scenario may resonate with esoteric images of a gothic horror novel, a moment of personal reflec57

Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Associate Director, Division of Advertising Practices, Federal Trade Commission, to Gary Ruskin, Executive Director, Consumer Alert (June 27, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/
commercialalertletter.shtm.
58
Id.
59
Letter From Heather Hippsley, Acting Associate Director, Division of Advertising Practices, Federal Trade Commission, to Search Engine Companies (Jun. 27,
2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/commercialalertattatch.
shtm.
60
FALLOWS, supra note 3, at 17. In the years following the FTC’s Letter to Search
Engine Companies and their general compliance with the FTC’s proposals, sixty-two
percent of searchers are still unable to distinguish between sponsored and organic
results. Id.
61
NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES 4–61 (2002). In a
nutshell, Klein argues that consumers make brand choices based on familiarity and
“loyalty.” In this respect, most consumers whose grade schools had Coke machines
are Coca-Cola consumers. She therefore argues that corporations are aware of this
phenomenon and focus their marketing revenue towards creating brand loyalty by
asserting their corporate presence into disparate cultural areas. See also Ellen P.
Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 89 (2006) (describing the branding process as embedding promotional material into media that
otherwise appears to be independent content).
62
KLEIN, supra note 61, at 59–60.
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tion reveals the premise’s veracity. Moreover, it is difficult to break
the brand habit; Klein argues that the majority of daily consumer decisions, such as which peanut butter to purchase or, yes, which search
63
engine to use, are dictated by addiction to a specific brand.
It is reasonable to assume that Google intended to and succeeded in creating a “brand.” Consumers no longer “search” for in64
formation on the Internet, they “google” it.
Through the use of
clever marketing coupled with an aesthetically pleasing user interface, Google triumphed in creating a lasting, powerful brand. This
could account for the fact that younger users, those who literally grew
up on the Internet, are more (troublingly) confident in and more
65
(brazenly) loyal to their personal preference in search engines.
(Most adult users tend to favor, and consistently use, only one or two
66
search engines.) This loyalty is most likely attributed to mere devotion to an ideal as opposed to the reliability of the search results.
Google’s users may as well be describing an Italian sports car when
they say that they prefer Google over its competitors because it is
67
“clean” and “fast.”
Google’s users prefer Google not because of the objectivity of results, but because Google’s product is the Internet equivalent to the
shiniest bicycle in the store. One savvy user has troublingly responded that “I use [Google] almost exclusively because it is fast and
accurate. I go directly to vendor sites [from the search results page]

63

Id. at 90.
See Frank Ahrens, goo·gle (goo'-gul), WASH. POST, Jul. 7, 2006, at D1 (stating that
as of July 6, 2007, the editors of Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary added the
transitive verb “to google” into the American lexicon). For a discussion of Google,
Inc.’s fear that the verb “to google” will (as is already the case) refer to Internet
searches generally and not just to searches performed at Google.com, see Frank
Ahrens, So Google Is No Brand X, but What Is ‘Genericide’?, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2006, at
D1.
65
FALLOWS, supra note 3, at 23.
66
See id. at 13 (stating that “44% of searchers say they regularly use a single
search engine, while most of the rest, 48%, will use just two or three”). It is important to compare this figure with the fact that Google currently retains sixty-seven percent of the search engine market. Lohr, supra note 7. These numbers suggest a decidedly large percentage of Internet search engine users only use Google. If there
are 1.2 billion people online everyday, and fifty-six percent use the search engine
everyday, then it is reasonable to assume that sixty-seven percent of those searching
will use Google. Finally, forty-four percent of all regular search engine users are loyal
to only one provider. FALLOWS, supra note 3, at 23. Therefore, as a rough estimate,
nearly 200 million search engine users are completely loyal to Google.com. See
FALLOWS, Summary of Findings, in supra note 3, at i; Lohr, supra note 7; Miniwatts Marketing Group, supra note 30.
67
FALLOWS, supra note 3, at 14.
64
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68

when I have that option.” While users also claim that they require
objectivity, and that they would stop using a specific search engine if
69
it used deceptive advertising practices, empirical data strongly suggest that users are too bewildered by and loyal to their search engine
brand of choice to adequately impose an economic market threat to
search engine companies. In short, so long as Google continues to
deliver relevant results, then users will continue to maintain their loyalty.
At this point, it is necessary to fully illuminate a distinction that
will carry throughout the remainder of this Comment: there is a subtle but crucial distinction between “accurate” search results and “relevant” search results. “Accuracy,” the more restrictive of the two
words, is defined as “the condition or quality of being true, correct,
70
or exact; freedom from error or defect; precision or exactness.” By
contrast, “relevancy” is defined as the condition of “bearing upon or
71
being connected with the matter at hand; pertinent.” Thus, when a
search engine provides an “accurate” result, it is behaving in a purely
objective manner, one that is akin to the factual rigor consumers expect from quality newspaper reporting. On the other hand, a “relevant” search result need only be “connected” to the query, therefore
allowing the search engine to subjectively modify the results page—
the clever placement of advertisements, for example.
For a marketing megalodon such as Google, which tracks the
consumption habits of its users though various electronic means, it
will not prove difficult to proffer “relevant” results to a naïve searcher
base: in fact, AdWords results are by their very nature simply relevant.
Perhaps Google could maintain its market position by providing and
placing relevant advertising. It is far more economically onerous for
Google to provide users with highly accurate results. It is helpful to
envision two concentric circles, the interior one labeled “accurate”
and the exterior one labeled “relevant.” Using this paradigm and
available data, it is likely that any market response aimed at Google
will only occur as the results approach the dubiously relevant. To
ameliorate the market pressure, Google merely needs to ensure that
its search results fall somewhere short of the margins of relevancy,

68

Id.
Id. at 20 (“Some 45% of searchers said they would stop using a search engine if
they didn’t make it clear that some results were paid or sponsored.”).
70
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 14 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S].
71
Id. at 1628.
69
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but it need not ensure that the results are squarely within the more
restrictive confines of accuracy.
Thus, for Google to maintain its market share it need only provide users with relevant results because users, concerned primarily
with aesthetics and relevancy, are unaware of Google’s slight of hand.
These naïve users will probably not abandon Google because they are
too loyal to their brand and lack the capacity to distinguish relevancy
from accuracy. Provided that Google continues to strive for relevancy
in their sponsored results and advertising, it will reinforce both its
72
market share and its users’ loyalty. What can the law do to protect
search engine users? Given the ironic failure of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the court system’s alacrity to overprotect search
results, Google could substitute relevancy for accuracy without consequence from either the economic markets or the legal community.
The threat posed by under-regulation is twofold: first is the issue of
consumer protection; second is the threat that unregulated search
engines, as information bottlenecks, may pose to our contemporary
73
version of the Library of Alexandria.
III. FTC REGULATION AND FIRST AMENDMENT ABSOLUTISM:
OPEN DOORS AND GIANT HURDLES
A. Andrew Sinclair Proposes FTC Regulation of Google
Andrew Sinclair was one of the earliest scholars to confront the
issue of whether search engines should be regulated by the federal
74
government. Sinclair proposed that two policy goals would be ad-

72

See Sinclair, supra note 15, at 359 (citing CONSUMER WEBWATCH, A MATTER OF
TRUST: WHAT USERS WANT FROM WEBSITES 17, http://www.consumerwebwatch.
org/pdfs/a-matter-of-trust.pdf) (last visited Jan. 13, 2009) (“[C]onsumers . . . [are]
unaware that they are not getting the most relevant search results.”).
73
The bigger they are the harder they fall.
74
Sinclair, supra note 15, at 360–61. Sinclair, perhaps ignoring the flaws of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, stated that the Federal Government, and not the
states, is positioned to regulate the Internet because the Internet is part of interstate
commerce and therefore “demands consistent treatment that can only be achieved
by federal regulation.” Id. at 360. However, an examination of the Telecommunications Act reveals that the Congress intended telecom regulation to occur at the state
level provided the regulation is “competitively neutral.” See H.R. REP. NO. 104-458 at
126. The neutrality requirement is perhaps a uniformity requirement, as it would be
difficult to conceptualize a varied regulatory scheme that would not run afoul of the
dormant commerce clause by placing an undue burden on interstate commerce. See,
e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970) (holding that Arizona’s interest in protecting its businesses and consumers from deceptive packaging was not
substantial enough to justify the burden imposed on interstate commerce).
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vanced by federal regulation of search engine results: (1) that regulation of deceptive practices would increase the searcher’s ability to lo75
cate the information for which he is looking; and (2) that regulation would provide the searcher with a remedy for deceptive search
76
engine practices.
In order to achieve the aforementioned policy
goals, Sinclair reasoned that either the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) or the FTC could, under their statutorily granted
rulemaking authority, promulgate specific rules to protect consumers
by requiring search engines to distinguish the sponsored results from
77
the organic results—the relevant from the accurate.
Sinclair identified the FTC as the appropriate regulatory body.
Because the FTC has already asserted authority over analogous forms
78
of advertising media, it is the best equipped to manage the problem
of deceptive advertising practices by search engine companies. Under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, Sinclair proposes
that the FTC require (1) that sponsored results “Contain an Identify79
ing Phrase such as ‘Paid Listing,’” (2) that “Paid Listings Should be
80
Spatially and Colorfully Separated from Unpaid Listings,” and (3)
that “Paid Listings Should Have At Least One Other Identifiable Dif81
ference” from the organic results. Sinclair’s hydra-headed remedy
actually advances three policy goals—that forcing search engines to
clearly disclose sponsorship will decrease customer confusion, increase the relevance of search engine results, and provide an injured
party with a remedy.
Ultimately, Sinclair urged that the FTC take adjudicative action
under his proposed rules to reduce any confusion that may arise
among search engines as to compliance. By so doing, the FTC will
take a “strict stance against deceptive advertising online to match that
82
against deceptive advertising on television and in print.” However,
one exceptionally powerful principle obstructs Sinclair’s proposed
75

See Sinclair, supra note 15, at 375.
Id.
77
Id. at 361–64.
78
Id. at 360–63. Specifically, Sinclair argues that the FTC has authority under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2000), to regulate deceptive acts in which “the consumer is likely to suffer injury from a material
misrepresentation.” Id. (citing In re Nat’l Media Corp., Inc., 116 F.T.C. 549, 559
(1993) (consent order)).
79
Id. at 369.
80
Sinclair, supra note 15, at 370.
81
Id. at 371 (This rule is intended to provide room for “search engine creativity”
while reinforcing the “distinction between paid and unpaid links.”).
82
Id. at 378.
76
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FTC action: the First Amendment. Sinclair addressed the free speech
hurdle quickly by stating the likelihood that courts would consider
regulation of search engine results under the commercial speech
83
doctrine as outlined in Central Hudson. In light of recent scholar84
ship, and the latest judicial decisions attempting to define the free85
speech component of search law, Sinclair’s proposal requires a
more thorough examination.
B. Problematic Precedent and First Amendment Absolutism
The threshold obstacle to FTC regulation of search engines’
sponsored results is determining whether Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
86
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, and its reaffirmation of the right
to be free from compelled speech, prohibits Sinclair’s proposed regulation. In Hurley, the Supreme Court of the United States faced the
issue of “whether Massachusetts may require private citizens who organize a parade to include among the marchers a group imparting a
87
message the organizers do not wish to convey.” The issue came before the Court on a petition for certiorari by Hurley and the private
organizers of the parade, the South Boston Allied War Veterans
Council (Council). In 1992, the respondents—members of the Boston Area Gay, Lesbian, and Bi-Sexual Organization (GLIB)—applied
88
to take part in that year’s parade. After the Council rejected GLIB’s
application, GLIB obtained a state court order requiring the Council
89
to permit GLIB’s members to march. In 1993, GLIB again sought
the Council’s permission to march in the parade, and the Council
90
again denied GLIB’s request. GLIB filed suit in state court “alleging
violations of the State and Federal Constitutions and of the state pub91
The state trial court ruled in favor of
lic accommodations law.”
83

Id. at 363–64 (acknowledging that the “First Amendment may offer some hurdles to the regulation of paid search engine listings”).
84
See Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in NonCommercial Speech, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379 (2006); Goodman, supra note 61; Volokh, supra note 24.
85
See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007); Search
King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193 (W.D.
Okla. May 27, 2003).
86
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557 (1995).
87
Id. at 559.
88
Id. at 561.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 561. For the full text of Massachusetts’s public accommodation law, see
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2007).
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GLIB and held that a parade falls within the definition of a public ac92
commodation.
In doing so, the Massachusetts court disregarded
the Council’s argument that GLIB’s inclusion in the parade violated
93
the Council’s First Amendment rights. The Council subsequently
appealed the trial court’s determination to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, which affirmed the lower court’s decision as
94
not clearly erroneous. The state supreme court held that there was
95
no expressive purpose in the parade. Upon an unfavorable verdict
in the state supreme court, the Council petitioned for certiorari in
96
the Supreme Court of the United States.
GLIB’s first argument urged the Court to find that a parade does
not contain First Amendment speech. Writing for a unanimous
Court, Justice Souter declared that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wrongly decided that a parade contains no expressive con97
duct. Souter stated that a parade indicates that the marchers “are
making some sort of collective point, not just to each other but to by98
standers along the way.” After determining that the Council’s parade contained sufficient expression to warrant First Amendment
protection, Justice Souter acknowledged that a parade need not have
99
a “succinctly articulable message” to achieve First Amendment protection, and that inherent within the liberty provided by the First
100
Amendment is the freedom to abstain from speaking.
The Court
upheld the autonomy of the speaker by stating that whatever the reason for the Council’s exclusion of GLIB, “it boils down to the choice
of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that
choice is presumed to lie beyond the government’s power to con101
trol.”
Turning next to the argument that Massachusetts’s public accommodation law prohibited the Council’s exclusionary action, GLIB

92

Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561.
Id. at 563.
94
Id. at 564.
95
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. Boston, 636
N.E.2d 1293, 1295–98 (Mass. 1994).
96
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557
97
Id.at 579.
98
Id. at 568.
99
Id. at 569.
100
Id. (citing West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943)); see
also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment
protects the decisions of private individuals not to display “Live Free or Die” on their
state issued license plate).
101
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575.
93
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urged that “any tension between [the no compelled speech rule] and
102
the Massachusetts law falls short of unconstitutionality.” In support
of its argument, GLIB cited to Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
103
FCC, in which the United States Supreme Court refused to apply
104
strict scrutiny in order to ameliorate “[the] potential for abuse of
105
In
[a] private power over a central avenue of communication.”
Turner Broadcasting, Turner, the petitioner, asserted that the First
Amendment right to abstain from speech protected the company
from government regulation of its broadcast pursuant to the Televi106
The Court reasoned that
sion Consumer Protection Act of 1992.
the FCC regulation should be analyzed under Congress’s power to
107
“correct market failure in a market whose commodity is speech”
and that congressional exercise of such power is not unconstitutional
108
so long as the regulation is content neutral.
Because the requirement to carry local broadcasting merely limited the ability of Turner
109
to compete in economic markets, because it did not favor one form
110
of speech over another, and because there was an important gov111
ernmental interest, the Court analyzed whether the regulation was
112
However, there was a “paucity of evidence insufficiently tailored.

102

Id.
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (plurality opinion).
104
Id. at 659–63.
105
Id. at 657.
106
Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992). The act required cable companies,
inter alia, to include in their transmissions local network broadcasts and qualified
educational programming. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 630–31.
107
Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 640 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 316 U.S.
1 (1945)).
108
Id. at 642–43.
109
Id. at 637. Turner Broadcasting, however, noted that “dysfunction or failure in a
speech market, without more, is not sufficient to shield a speech regulation from the
First Amendment standards applicable to nonbroadcast media.” Id. at 640. Yet, as to
Google and it enormous market share, there is more than a mere dysfunction in the
speech market, there is actual customer confusion as to the nature of the results. See
infra notes 217–19 and accompanying text.
110
Specifically, the Court stated that “given cable’s long history of serving as a conduit for broadcast signals, there appears little risk that cable viewers would assume
that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator.” Id at 656.
111
Id. at 662–63 (identifying three important governmental interests: “(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the
widespread dissemination of information for a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for television programming”). Id. at 662.
112
Id. at 664–68.
103
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dicating that broadcast television is in jeopardy,” and the Court
could not determine if the regulation restricted “substantially more
114
speech than necessary” to further its goals.
Ultimately, the Court
reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the govern115
ment and remanded the case back to the district court.
Turning back to the Hurley decision, the Court rejected GLIB’s
argument that Turner Broadcasting mandates the application of intermediate scrutiny to the trial court’s decision that GLIB must be al116
The Court distinguished Turner
lowed to march in the parade.
Broadcasting on several grounds: (1) because it is likely that viewers
117
would assume that the Council endorsed GLIB’s message; (2) because a cable operator is a “monopolistic opportunity to shut out
118
some speakers”; and (3) GLIB could have applied for its own parade permit, and thus it failed to show that the Council had the “capacity to ‘silence the voice of competing speakers,’ as cable operators
119
Therefore, the Court applied strict scrutiny, stated that there
do.”
was an alternative venue for GLIB’s speech, and found that forcing
the Council to allow GLIB’s participation in the parade infringed on
120
the Council’s First Amendment right to autonomy of speech.
Because the most logical assumption is that the FTC would use
its authority to protect consumers from injury due to deceptive advertising practices, Google would likely characterize its sponsored results
as speech protected by the First Amendment, therefore seeking to
have the court scrutinize the FTC regulation pursuant to Hurley. In
order to assert a First Amendment challenge to FTC regulation,
Google would, at a threshold level, need to show that its search results are entitled to full First Amendment free speech guarantees.
However, it is unlikely that Google would receive full First Amendment protection. First, Hurley is distinguishable from the current
situation with Google because a parade fundamentally differs from a
121
website. The former makes “some sort of collective point” because
113

Turner Broadcasting, at 667. Further, it is likely that the government would be
able to show that the search engine market, and therefore the Internet, is in jeopardy.
114
Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 668 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 799 (1989)).
115
Id.
116
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 258–59.
117
Id. at 576–77.
118
Id. at 577.
119
Id. at 578 (citing Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 656).
120
Id. at 580–81.
121
Id. at 568.
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each of the marchers participate with a common goal—in the case of
a St. Patrick’s day parade, they speak not only as individuals but also as
a group possessing a common theme (their love for green beer?).
Google’s search results have no such theme or unity of purpose; in
fact, those who participate in AdWords foster no such group purpose,
to the contrary, they all desire to standout as individual businesses,
devoid of affiliation with a collective, free-speech goal or opinion. In
short, Google’s AdWords program, in its entirety, fails to capture a
122
Thus, assuming that the contours
“succinctly articulable message.”
of any FTC disclosure rule are content neutral, the principles articu123
lated in Hurley do not prohibit the disclosure as compelled speech.
Because the purpose of this Comment is to advocate on behalf
of consumer protection and potential regulation, an examination of
a recent federal court’s treatment of Google as a speaker is also important. Recently, in Langdon v. Google, Inc., the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, granting Google’s summary
judgment motion, extended robust First Amendment protection to
124
Langdon, the owner of two Internet websites,
Google.
125
www.NCJusticeFraud.com and www.ChinaIsEvil.com, alleged that
Google refused to allow advertisements for both websites and sought
126
Further, Langdon argued that
damages and injunctive relief.
“Google gave a fraudulent excuse for not running the [advertisements], and that the reasons for refusal do not appear on [Google’s]
127
In this respect, Langdon
website or in its ad content policy.”
claimed that Google’s refusals violated his rights under the First and
128
Fourteenth Amendments.
More specifically, he averred that the
“rejection or acceptance of ads is based upon whether the political
viewpoint of the ad and the related website agree with those of
129
Finally, he “allege[d] that he
Google’s executives and employees.”
ha[d] no viable alternative other than to advertise on Defendants’
122

Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. The only conceivable collective point AdWord participants are possibly making is purely for the purposes of inducing a commercial transaction, which favors treating the speech, in the collective, pursuant to the commercial speech doctrine. Infra note 152 and accompanying text.
123
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 642–43.
124
Langdon v. Google, Inc, 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007).
125
Id. at 626.
126
Id. at 627.
127
Id. at 626.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 626. Langdon also alleged that Google’s de-listing of the NCJustice website “hurt his rankings with other search engines,” and that Google’s current policy of
allowing China to censor Google’s search results “does not allow advertisement critical of the Chinese government.” Id. at 627.
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130

search engines.”
After a discussion of various procedural and
pleading issues raised by the defendants arising from the plaintiff’s
131
pro se status, the district court analyzed the defendants’ First
132
Amendment Rights.
In its defense, Google argued that granting Langdon injunctive
“relief would compel [it] to speak in a manner deemed appropriate
by Plaintiff and would prevent [it] from speaking in ways that Plaintiff
133
Ultimately, the court agreed with Google that its First
dislikes.”
134
HowAmendment rights precluded the relief the plaintiff sought.
ever, instead of narrowly limiting its holding to the facts of the current case, the district court extended remarkably broad constitutional
protection to Google. Essentially, the court granted Google the same
135
First Amendment status as newspaper editors.
By characterizing
Google’s activities as that of a newspaper editor, the district court
shielded Google from all liability stemming from its so-called editorial
136
decisions.
The district court did not need to extend such broad constitutional protection to Google’s advertising and search results. The
court found adequate justification for Google’s action pursuant to
137
which “provides
the Communications Decency Act (CDA),
[Google] immunity from suit from claims grounded upon their exer130

Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 627.
Id. at 625–29.
132
Id. at 629.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 634.
135
See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (holding that a state statute requiring newspapers to present a right of response to political
candidates violated the First Amendment).
136
This is not the only case in which Google sought to classify itself as a speaker
with a First Amendment opinion. In Search King, Google argued that de-listing the
plaintiff’s customer’s webpage was an act shielded from tort liability under the First
Amendment because it was per se lawful. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech. Inc., No.
CIV-01-1457-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193, at *9 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003). The
Search King court determined that Google’s organic search results represented an
opinion of relevance based on keywords. Id. at *11. Therefore, even if Google acted
maliciously and willfully in the de-listing of the webpages, the plaintiff was afforded
no remedy due to freedom of speech. Id. at *13. However, Google does not always
wish to style itself as a subjective speaker. In Google, Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C-03-5340, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 18, 2007), the plaintiff sued Google alleging that Google committed trademark
infringement. Google claimed that its AdWords program is completely objective,
and that it is therefore at the mercy of the consumer who purchased the specific
keywords. Id. at *9 n.6. In short, it appears that Google seeks to inconsistently characterize itself when it comes to avoiding liability.
137
The Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2000).
131
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cise of editorial discretion over Internet content and editorial decisions regarding screening and deletion of content from their ser138
vices” regardless of whether the material is constitutionally pro139
tected. The district court determined that based on the complaint,
the plaintiff sought to hold Google liable for actions relating to the
“monitoring, screening and deletion of content from their network”
140
and that based on applicable case law, such actions are immunized
141
under section 230 of the CDA.
The plaintiff’s final relevant argument was a claim under 28
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Google violated the plaintiff’s First
142
Amendment rights by de-listing the plaintiff’s websites.
Because
the plaintiff could not establish that Google was a government ac143
tor, because the court determined that Google was not a public fo144
145
rum, and because the plaintiff had alternative venues for speech,
146
Google was not liable under section 1983.
While it seems that Google possesses a strong constitutional argument against government regulation of its search results, even
commentators who are staunch advocates for First Amendment absolutism would probably not argue against FTC regulation of Google’s
sponsored results. For example, Professor Eugene Volokh argues
that government regulation and limitations on people’s ability to disseminate information about a private individual are generally im-

138

Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
140
Ezra v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000).
141
Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 630 (“Section 230 provides Google . . . immunity
for their editorial decisions regarding screening and deletion from their network.”).
142
Id. at 632.
143
“Defendants are private, for-profit companies, not subject to constitutional free
speech guarantees.” Id. at 631. However, it is also important to note that the Langdon court identified Google as a corporation that “uses the internet to conduct business.” Id.
144
The plaintiff argued that Google’s service was analogous to a shopping center;
however, the analogy was misplaced for the purposes of First Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 632.
145
“The Court finds unavailing Plaintiff’s argument that he has no reasonable alternative to advertising on the Defendant’s search engines.” Id.
146
Id. at 632. The court also dismissed the plaintiff’s Delaware free speech claim,
the plaintiff’s claim of fraud under Delaware law, and the plaintiff’s claim of deceptive business practices under Delaware law. Id. at 632–35. The state free speech
claim was dismissed because the court determined that the reaches of the Delaware
Constitution are identical to the Federal Constitution; the court dismissed the fraud
claim because the plaintiff failed to satisfy the intent to induce element; and finally,
the court dismissed the deceptive business practice claim because, under Delaware
law, there is no private right of action for deceptive business practices. Id.
139
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147

permissible unless they are rooted in several narrow exceptions.
First, Volokh states that speech restrictions based on contract between the potential speaker and the individual subject are constitu148
Second, Volokh finds little
tional under Cohen v. Cowles Media.
worry with regulation of speech that cuts to the heart of the commer149
cial speech doctrine.
Therefore, if Google’s AdWords are “commercial speech,” as is likely the case, then the FTC could require
Google to clearly disclose that such speech was paid for, provided the
150
speech has the propensity to deceive.
To Volokh, and, by extension, to other First Amendment absolutists, the commercial speech doctrine is a relatively non-threatening
151
exception to robust speech protection.
Presumably, this exception
is permissible because it is a constitutional form of consumer protection. As Volokh states, “the Court’s most common definition of
commercial speech is speech that explicitly or implicitly ‘propose[s] a
152
commercial transaction.’”
An advertisement seeking to induce a
consumer to enter into a financial transaction in exchange for goods
or services would be the classic model of commercial speech. Hypothetically, a business might say, “Our widgets are made with only onehundred percent post-consumer recycled materials.” If it turns out
that the widget is actually produced from one hundred percent mercury, then clearly the commercial speech doctrine would allow the
FTC to forbid the company from airing this advertisement under sec153
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act because it is likely that
the consumer would suffer injury from the company’s material mis154
representation.
Volokh goes on to contrast commercial speech with situations
regarding data privacy that are only tangentially related to this Comment. He states that when a corporation offers to sell information
about its consumers to another interested corporation, this transaction in data cannot be constitutionally regulated under a properly
155
framed commercial speech doctrine. The principle underlying this
formulation of the doctrine is that such speech does not implicate
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Volokh, supra note 24.
Id. at 1057 (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991)).
Id. at 1079–87.
Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976).
See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1079–87.
Id. at 1081.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
Id.
Volokh, supra note 24, at 1085.
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“fraud in a particular commercial transaction,” and in Volokh’s
view the implication of fraud is the primary justification for the regu157
lation of commercial speech. This Comment argues that commonlaw fraud does not adequately protect consumers’ interest in the
Internet in that fraud is not intended to nor capable of correcting a
158
market that is on the verge of monopoly.
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF GOOGLE’S SPONSORED RESULTS:
EDITOR OR ADVERTISER?
A. Regulatory Goals in a Monopoly Market
The regulation of advertisement under the commercial speech
doctrine is a rather broadly drawn exception to First Amendment
protections. The policy rests upon the notion that the corporation
has far greater access to information about its goods or services than
does the consumer; therefore, the corporation is situated to potentially cause harm to public heath and welfare if it engages in decep159
Deceptive advertising poses an anticompetitive effect
tive speech.
because it can, in a saturated market, create barriers to entry for potential competitors, such as high entry costs. The commercial speech
doctrine is a method of protecting competition in the marketplace by
allowing regulation of deceptive advertising.
Assume that Alex Corporation (A), a newcomer in the industry,
and Bain Corporation (B), who controls seventy percent of the market-share, both produce economy-class automobiles. In order to gain
a commercial advantage over B, A decides to launch a nationwide
newspaper advertising campaign. Suppose that, in an isolated incident, one of B’s cars spontaneously combusted, although no one was
injured. In order to capitalize on B’s misfortune, A publishes photographs showing B’s auto-flambé from various angles so as to create
the impression that a substantial number of B’s cars inevitably end up
in flames. Also on the page is a statement reading “Alex’s Cars Won’t
156

Id. at 1082.
However, under the Federal Trade Commission Act, the agency does not need
to prove actual fraud to regulate the applicable industry; it need only to show that
the advertising in question has the propensity to deceive. Infra note 209 and accompanying text.
158
This Comment uses the word “monopoly” not as a term of art pursuant to the
law of antitrust. Instead, “monopoly” is to be understood in the context of Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Turner Broadcasting. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 661–62 (1994).
159
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6
(1980).
157
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Kill You.” Without the commercial speech doctrine, this type of advertising would be permissible speech; further, if a private individual
published the exact same treatment, the First Amendment would bar
160
the government from regulating the information.
A commercial enterprise understands that when it advertises,
and thereby promotes a commercial transaction, it is subject to potential government regulation if the advertisement is more likely to
161
mislead the consumer than to inform and if there is a likelihood of
162
The commercial speech doctrine protects
injury to the consumer.
competition by permitting the government to regulate a direct or indirect attack on other businesses by deceiving consumers—such attacks may go beyond rigorous competition and thus become anticompetitive, especially when the actor enjoys significant market
163
power.
Further, FTC regulation is intended to place businesses on
a somewhat equal footing when it comes to their ability to propose
commercial transactions; it prevents a dominant firm from misleading consumers as to a competitor’s product, an act that may harm
competition by preventing or discouraging new market entry. It also
places businesses on level ground, because once an FTC regulation is
in place, it prohibits businesses from falling below the FTC standard,
thereby protecting the communications medium itself.
Given
Google’s significant market share and its consumer loyalty, it is not
unfathomable to assume that their deceptive advertising practices
may be intended to have an anticompetitive effect on the search engine market.
An obvious, yet disputed, anticompetitive effect is called “freeriding.” Free-riding, in its most common form, is generally not considered to be anticompetitive because it may have a positive effect on
consumer prices. However, the form of free-riding that this Comment suggests that Google is engaging in is, in many ways, the converse to the traditional free-rider model. Google is inducing advertisers to free-ride on its dominance. This is best illustrated by an
example. Imagine a world where only some TV stations disclose that
164
An obvious problem pre“the following is a paid advertisement.”
160

See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1086 (explaining that when consumers leaflet
against a shoddy developer, the leafleters are entitled to full protection under the
First Amendment because their speech does not propose a commercial transaction).
161
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
162
Id.
163
See, e.g., Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc, 547 U.S. 28 (2006);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
164
This is the common disclaimer placed before an infomercial on network television because sponsorship law actually requires “broadcasters to identify those who
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sented by this is that consumers may assume that an infomercial, on
a station that does not post such a disclaimer, is actually news pro166
gramming and therefore endorsed by the station itself or at least
167
In short, the network
subject to fact checking and objectivity.
committed the “accuracy/relevancy” substitution. Furthermore,
168
there are downstream effects likely to affect competition.
First,
businesses will be more motivated to advertise with the network that
does not post the disclaimer and therefore, by piggybacking on the
goodwill of the network’s news division, increase its sales through de169
ceptive practices. The network will benefit from the windfall in advertising revenue, reinvest into its standard programming in an effort
to increase its goodwill among viewers, and be better positioned to
charge supercompetitive fees for its infomercial air space and, vis-à-vis
its market power, implement barriers to entry.
In a market dominated by advertisers freeloading on the network’s respectability, all the networks will likely, in an effort to remain competitive, conceptualize new ways to sell advertising in a deceptive manner. The television media would become entangled in a
cut-throat race to the bottom where all providers struggle to achieve
the most profitable business model, perhaps at the expense of the
170
Placing economic interests above quality and accuracy
consumer.
will harm consumers because the variety and veracity of network programming will be reduced. Society as a whole is damaged when a
speaker inculcates the gravity of his raw message with the advertising
pay for program material,” and provides penalties for those broadcasters who do not.
Goodman, supra note 61, at 64 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 317(a)(1), 508 (2000)).
165
Disclosure requirements under The Communications Act of 1996 do not apply
to obvious marketing such as the “traditional fifteen- or thirty-second spot advertisements, where both presence and source of sponsorship are obvious.” Id. at 97.
166
This of course assumes that the advertiser is using a news-type format for its
infomercial.
167
This is a classic example of what Ellen P. Goodman described as “stealth marketing.” She stated, “American mass media law has long been hostile to stealth marketing. It is illegal . . . for a record company to make secret payments to radio stations to play music . . . or for an advertiser or organization to pay broadcasters to
feature products . . . without identifying the sponsor.” Id. at 84; cf. id. at 91 (describing how sponsors “sometimes pay for ‘secured placement’ of their footage to achieve
a kind of ‘branded’ journalism”).
168
Id. at 100–04.
169
In his article, Volokh argues that there is nothing inherently wrong with businesses taking a free ride on the work of others. Volokh, supra note 24, at 1074. However, Volokh addresses this problem only by proposing that giving consumers a property right in their personal information would be economically inefficient. Id. He
does not address the problem freeriding presents to communications media under
the commercial speech doctrine.
170
Goodman, supra note 61, at 87.
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sheen, and he becomes a mouthpiece for the “simplified operational
171
mode.”
Dressing up an assumedly objective system, such as Google, with
advertising’s nebulous simplicity gravely shifts consumer expectations
from accuracy to relevancy, and this shift will bleed the medium itself.
Briefly outlined, the argument is as follows: consumers, initially expecting objectivity from Google yet aware of the presence of advertising, will begin to believe that everything appearing on the results
page is an advertisement. Even a subtle relocation of consumer expectations creates a strong economic incentive for advertisers to continually refine their use of covert advertising methods to remain one
step ahead of skeptical consumers. Ultimately, not only the message,
but the Internet itself (as a medium) will suffer because it has be172
When concome completely diluted with deceptive advertising.
sumers are unable to differentiate between advertising and informa173
tion unclouded by economic incentives, the FTC should act to
protect the channels and instrumentalities of communication—
especially when the medium is recognized as crucial to promoting
the interests of a democratic society. By eliminating an advertiser’s
ability to piggyback on the broadcaster’s reliability, the FTC protects
consumers and the integrity of a complex operational mode from unscrupulously simplistic media providers.
A tension undoubtedly exists between Google’s editorial freedom and the right of a sovereign to police the channels of speech. In
addressing this tension, it is important to determine whether the
Langdon court correctly classified Google as a newspaper editor, or
whether Google is more akin to something else: a purely commercial
speaker. However, the implications of characterizing Google as a
newspaper or as a broadcaster do not preclude the federal govern174
ment’s ability to regulate Google.
This classification is only determinative of which federal agency is best situated to promulgate rules.
Because this Comment addresses only whether regulation is permis171

BAUDRILLARD, supra note 1.
Goodman, supra note 61, at 104–08 (stating that the only wholly satisfying policy justification for regulation of deceptive advertising is that “overcommercialization” will “hijack[] authentic culture and turn[] ‘America’s marketplace of idea’s [into] . . . a junkyard of commodity ideology.’”).
173
Id. at 110 (“The purpose of stealth marketing is to bypass audience resistance
to promotional messages by giving an erroneous impression of source.”).
174
Even if the Langdon court was correct in extending newspaper-like editorial
status to Google, the FCC could still require clear sponsorship disclosure under the
Federal Communications Act of 1934. See, e.g., Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp.
2d 622 (D. Del. 2007).
172
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sible and appropriate, there is no discussion of whether the FTC or
176
the FCC is better positioned to confront the consumer protection
issue in the context of cyberspace. Further, it is important to note
that this Comment assumes that application of advertising source disclosure rules will not damage discourse because the cost to Google, as
177
a speaker and as a business, is minimal.
B. Google Is a Commercial Speaker Because Its Primary Corporate
Purpose Is to Further Commercial Transactions
This Comment adopts the rationale presented in an article by
178
Tom Bennigson.
His basic premise is simple: a commercial entity
that is publicly traded on a national market cannot be anything other
179
than a commercial speaker.
In support of his argument, Bennigson first looks to the fiduci180
In
ary obligations of directors and managers of a corporation.
American corporate law, the managers have a duty to the shareholders to increase the value of the corporation as a whole. In this respect, a shareholder may bring a derivative action challenging the
decision of a manager who uses the corporate treasury for an activity
constituting a breach of the duty of care or a breach of the duty of
loyalty. It is the primary concern of the managers of the company to
increase the value of the shareholders’ stock, and any action which
deviates from this premise could be considered corporate waste and
therefore subject to a derivative suit for breach of the duty of care or
loyalty.
This analysis begs the question of the permissible scope of the
manager’s decision-making abilities. The corporate manager is duty
bound to increase the revenue of the corporation. In order to accomplish this task, the manager needs to induce consumers to enter

175

For a discussion advocating on behalf of FTC regulation, see Sinclair, supra
note 15, at 360–64 (discussing which regulatory body is best suited to regulate search
engines, and concluding that the FTC is the appropriate arm of government).
176
The Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2000) (requiring
broadcast stations to disclose the identity of sponsors when any type of “valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid or promised, charged or accepted”).
177
This presumption is evidenced by the fact that disclosure regulations of broadcast radio and television did not damage speech at large. See Volokh, supra note 24,
at 1112; see id. at 1052 (arguing that favoring data privacy over First Amendment absolutism will provide courts with dangerous precedent which could be used to suppress speech that was once protected but interferes with various civil rights).
178
Bennigson, supra note 84.
179
Id. at 383.
180
Id. at 393–96.
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into a financial transaction with the business. The directors’ responsibility to shareholders is not without limits. As stated earlier in this
Comment, a business engages in corporate speech when the purpose
of the speech in question is primarily to induce a commercial transac181
tion.
By examining the Supreme Court’s rationale for providing
lesser protection for commercial speech, Bennigson concludes that
commercial speech is entitled to lower scrutiny because it implicates
only the speech interests of the listener—i.e., the corporate speaker’s
182
In determining whether speech should
interest is not expressive.
be considered commercial pursuant to the First Amendment, the
Court looks to whether the speech is “motivated solely by the
speaker’s economic interests and is related to furthering commercial
183
transactions.”
The question thus becomes whether Google’s sponsored results
should be considered commercial speech. The first prong of the commercial speech analysis is whether Google’s sponsored results are
184
At
solely motivated by the economic interests of the corporation.
first blush, it seems evident that Google’s AdWords program serves
no other purpose than to generate revenue for shareholders. As
stated earlier in this Comment, Google generated $10.6 billion in ad185
However, the mere fact that a category
vertising revenue in 2006.
of speech is profitable should not be dispositive for a finding that the
186
speech is commercial.
There are several instances where a speaker
may have a mere scintilla of motivation not related to economic interests. A newspaper certainly desires a profit for its efforts, however
there is a clear dual purpose: newspapers also desire to be the most
readable, the most erudite, or the most groundbreaking—they strive
for accuracy. Google’s AdWords program, by contrast, has no such
secondary concerns. Their goal is to place relevant advertising—
181

Volokh, supra note 24, 1081–82.
In support of this argument, Bennigson cites to the recent string of cases limiting a corporation’s ability to fund political campaigns. He states that because the
corporation is made of stockholders, it would be illogical to assume that corporate
donations represent the political voices of the individual shareholders. Bennigson,
supra note 84, at 401. Therefore, even corporate political contributions are not fully
protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 402–04. Also, under the GLIB rationale, a speech may be considered controllable if it has no expressive purpose. See
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. Boston, 636 N.E.2d
1293, 1295–98 (Mass. 1994).
183
Bennigson, supra note 84, at 395.
184
Id. at 388 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 557, 561 (1980)).
185
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
186
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975).
182
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under the Hurley rationale, Google’s purpose is fundamentally non187
expressive, and is not afforded full First Amendment protection.
Therefore, the editorial content of a newspaper is substantially distinguishable from the editorial control Google asserts over its AdWords program: one strives for accuracy and the other simple relevance.
Likewise, Google does exhibit a motivation that superficially appears without economic incentives with respect to AdWords. Google
seeks to provide its users with relevant information based on the key188
words they enter. However, while it is obviously tempting to equate
189
such relevancy with the accuracy newspapers strive to achieve,
Google, as an advertising entity, does not retain the same societal interests as the editor of a newspaper. Google’s AdWords seek to put
the most relevant commercial vendor at the top of the search results
list. By engaging in this practice, Google signals to potential businesses that they will get the most receptive eyes on the business’s ad190
At its bare essence, Google’s struggle for relevancy is
vertisements.
motivated not by a puritanical desire to accurately report on the cur191
rent state of commerce, but rather to leverage businesses into pur192
chasing advertising space on Google —this is not expressive conduct.
187

See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text.
See Google.com, Welcome To AdWords, https://adwords.google.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2009) (“When people search on Google using one of your keywords,
your ad may appear next to the search results. Now you’re advertising to an audience that’s already interested in you.”).
189
See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007); Search
King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193 at
*12–13 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
190
Thus, Google tacitly admits that the primary purpose of AdWords is to forward
it’s own economic interests, thereby subjecting the AdWords program to regulation.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
191
See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1052 (discussing how a broadened commercial
speech doctrine may serve to restrict speech by consumers on economic matters).
Volokh’s analysis, however, is mooted by Bennigson’s suggestion that courts consider
both the corporation’s motivation for speaking as well as the inducement requirement. See Bennigson, supra note 84, at 396.
192
This Comment recognizes that there exists a gray area as to whether the corporate speaker is motivated solely by commercial interests. Take for example a radio
disc jockey that knows that when he plays certain songs it is likely that the radio station will garner more profits through advertising revenue. A situation such as this
illustrates the potential dangers of examining the speaker’s motivation. Fortunately
for the courts, Congress drafted section 317 of the Communications Act which states
that such editorial decisions may only be regulated when any type of “valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid or promised, charged or accepted” in exchange for playing the song. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2000).
188
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Google’s own business plan, advertising, strongly evidences a
comfortable fit within the second prong of the commercial speech
193
analysis.
It is clear that Google’s AdWords are intended to induce
the consumer into making a commercial transaction. In the first instance, Google puts eyes on the advertisements and uses this ability to
attract businesses to enter into an advertising agreement with Goo194
Therefore, if a court were to require that the commercial
gle.
transaction induced needs to flow directly between the consumer and
the corporate speaker, this prong would be met. However, it seems
that inducement into any commercial transaction would be sufficient
to sustain a finding that Google’s AdWords are commercial speech.
195
For example, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., the Supreme Court treated a condom manufacturer’s informational pamphlet concerning the dangers of sexually transmitted diseases as
196
The manufacturer argued that this was a
commercial speech.
purely informational packet designed to inform the public about the
197
potential dangers of unprotected sexual intercourse. The Court
found that this pamphlet was designed to induce the sexually active
consumer into a commercial transaction and therefore considered
198
Presumably, the Court does not rethe flyer commercial speech.
quire the benefit to actually come from the consumer directly to the
corporate speaker—simply “educating” the public about STDs could
increase the total volume of condom sales, thereby increasing the
revenue generated by the corporate speaker.
Google’s AdWords may not directly induce a commercial transaction with Google; however, the purpose of placing third-party advertising in front of potentially willing consumers certainly is intended to induce the consumer to engage in a commercial
transaction with the third-party business. By increasing the visibility
of advertising, Google hopes to maximize the number of sales made
by the third-party advertisers and thereby increase the number of par193

Bennigson, supra note 84, at 396.
Google is currently developing Google Trends, a device that is putatively designed to assist businesses in choosing AdWords that have a high search volume. If a
potential advertiser wishes to see how many searches for a term occurred within a
time period and within a certain geographical area, it can do so. From that information, the advertiser can make an educated decision regarding what words to purchase. See Google Trends, http://www.google.com/trends (last visited Jan. 13,
2009).
195
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
196
Id. at 61.
197
Id. at 62.
198
Id. at 66–67.
194
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ticipants in AdWords. Finally, an increase in AdWords sales would
benefit Google by increasing revenue and ultimately the value of the
199
shareholder’s stake in the corporation.
As shown above, this form
of profit maximization may have significant anticompetitive effects,
such as barriers to entry and the potential destruction of an entire
market.
Free speech absolutists, who favor the holding in Langdon, argue
that the First Amendment should afford newspaper-like protection to
Google in order to ensure the diversity of viewpoints in the marketplace. Yet the primary justification for granting commercial speech
intermediate scrutiny is to “suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to [e]nsure that the flow of truthful and legitimate
200
commercial information is unimpaired.”
Beyond using this statement to support the constitutionality of FTC regulation of search engines, the court’s reasoning indicates that FTC regulation may further promote the commercial speech doctrine’s underlying
principles by ensuring that consumers have access to information
which is truthful and accurate before entering into a commercial
transaction. This argument assumes that there is true competition in
the search engine market. However, it is evident that the search en201
gine market is malfunctioning for several reasons.
First, the power that search engines wield as Internet gatekeepers affords them abundantly broad discretion in imposing barriers to
entry for potential speakers. This problem manifests itself in
Google’s AdWords program because the more necessary online ad202
vertising becomes to business success, the more expensive the AdWords will become. Second, customer confusion regarding whether
a search result is actually sponsored exacerbates the danger of the
Internet becoming nothing other than an indexed repository for advertising. In this respect, opening the door to potential federal disclosure regulation will reduce consumer confusion, and promote the

199

Sinclair’s proposed regulation would not be contrary to the Supreme Court’s
rationale in Turner. There the Court stated that forced speech is permissible because
it only limits the speaker’s ability to compete in an economic market. Turner Broad.
Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 645 (1994). In this respect, by forcing Google and
other search engines to disclose their paid advertisements, the FTC would not limit
Google’s expression, but only its ability to reap the benefits of an anticompetive, deceptive economic scheme. See id.
200
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977) (citing Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–72
(1975)).
201
See supra Part III.
202
Pasquale, supra note 13, at 130–34.
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acutely democratic free speech utopia promised by early Internet advocates. Regulation of search engine advertising promotes democratic ideals by reducing entry costs for potential speakers and protect203
Finally, because Google’s
ing the diversity of Internet speech.
speech is (properly) refashioned as commercial, there is constitutional room for federal regulation, even regulation that forces
Google, through narrow means, to “speak.”
V. SOLUTION: APPLYING SINCLAIR’S PROPOSAL TO
CENTRAL HUDSON AND 44 LIQUORMART
Sinclair’s Comment provides an excellent framework from
which to begin a discussion of regulating Google. Sinclair, undoubtedly eager to discuss potential regulation, only briefly addresses the
“First Amendment . . . hurdles to the regulation of paid search en204
gine listings” by stating that sponsored results are “probably ex205
empt[] . . . from First Amendment protection.”
While Sinclair
deems the commercial speech doctrine the appropriate legal portal
through which the FTC could regulate Google, there are lingering
difficulties. The most apparent dilemma is whether Google’s actions
are sufficiently deceptive to warrant an FTC rulemaking. If so, the
question must become whether any FTC rule aimed at Google would
survive under Central Hudson and its progeny. This section addresses
both of the aforementioned issues and then considers whether regulating Google is a wise policy choice.
A. FTC Regulatory Policy
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act makes unlawful
206
the use of deceptive acts or practices.
While the FTC has never
promulgated a single, definitive statement as to the FTC Act’s warrant
against deception, “[c]ertain elements undergird all deception

203

As a caveat, it is important to note that Google’s AdWords program does not
represent a “mixed” form of commercial and non-commercial speech. The sole purpose of the AdWords expression within the AdWords campaign is to effectuate
commercial transactions with third party vendors. This is not analogous to the situation the Court faced in Nike, where the dissenting Justices reasoned that a mixed
form of speech may require a delicate regulatory scheme in order to pass constitutional muster. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 676–77 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
204
Sinclair, supra note 15, at 364.
205
Id.
206
15 U.S.C. §41(a) (2000).
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207

cases.” The initial question the FTC must answer before it exercises
its jurisdiction under section 5 is whether there is a practice that is
likely to mislead the consumer. Under this analysis, the “entire . . .
208
course of dealing will be considered,” and the inquiry is “whether
the act or practice is likely to mislead, rather than whether it causes
209
actual deception.”
Judicial analysis directly tracks the FTC’s policy
statement; in an interpretation of section 5, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that “the likelihood or propensity of deception is the criterion by which advertising is meas210
ured.” Since the FTC’s inception, various courts have looked upon
its plenary authority to regulate deceptive practices regardless of the
seller’s scienter. In an early opinion, the Supreme Court held that a
seller’s innocent mislabeling of his wood as “white pine” did not absolve liability under the FTC Act, provided that the seller’s actions
211
have a propensity to deceive consumers.
In so holding, the Court
noted that “competition may be unfair within the meaning of this
statute and within the scope of the discretionary powers conferred on
the [FTC], though the practice condemned does not amount to
212
fraud as understood in [common law].”
Case law and the FTC’s own policy statements verify the proposition that the seller’s intent is irrelevant to deception. Abundant case
law indicates that proof of actual deception is not necessary, but may
213
be sufficient, under the FTC Act. Case law also labels section 5 as a
214
So long as the consumer
prophylactic measure against deception.
is likely to be deceived by an entire course of dealing, the FTC pos215
sesses the authority to impose consumer protection regulation.
In
many instances however, the FTC is positioned to provide actual evi207

HON. BOB PACKWOOD, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON
DECEPTION, reprinted in DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION
& THE LAW 826 (2007).
208
Id. at 828.
209
Id.
210
Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976).
211
FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934).
212
Id.
213
See Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977); U.S. Retail
Credit Ass’n v. FTC, 300 F.2d 212, 221 (4th Cir. 1962); Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d
369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943); In re Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
214
FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 699, 674 (2d Cir. 1963).
215
The policy rationale for judicial acquiescence to FTC regulation in the absence
of evidence of actual confusion is two-fold. First, the courts defer to the expertise of
the administrative body. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 207, at 770. Second, imposing a requirement of proof of actual consumer confusion would be “costly and
inefficient.” Id.
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dence of consumer deception. In a survey of case law, Pridgen and
Alderman demonstrate that courts routinely uphold FTC regulation
when between thirteen and twenty percent of consumers were actu216
ally mislead by the advertiser’s conduct.
At the current time, it is impossible to gauge with sufficient accuracy the exact percentage of Google users who are deceived into
clicking on advertisements. The most accurate estimate of deception
217
Pew found that one out of six, or
originates in the Pew study.
roughly seventeen percent, of Internet search engine users are un218
able to distinguish between sponsored and organic results.
Given
the empirical data, it appears that the FTC would be free to regulate
219
Under the
pursuant to a showing of actual consumer deception.
“entire course of dealing” analysis, the FTC could easily find that
Google is likely to mislead consumers into thinking that sponsored
results are accurate, organic results.
On January 18, 2009, a Google search for “shoes” revealed that
the search results yield a likelihood of deception. Google does not
spatially separate three sponsored results from the organic results.
Google does make an effort to distinguish between the two, but this
half-hearted attempt does not cure the results page of its deceptive
nature. The first three results are positioned directly above the organic results; the typeface is identical as between the two; and while
“sponsored result” does appear in the vicinity of the advertisements,
the color discreetly blends into the background and is almost imper220
ceptible to a reasonable user. Further, the term “sponsored results”
is placed on a separate visual plane from the results themselves. Even
the term “sponsored results” does not necessarily indicate that the results are paid for: the first definition of the verb “to sponsor” is,
221
Google hardly “vouches” for the
“promise, vouch, or answer for.”
AdWords participants, in fact, as shown in American Blind, Google dis-

216

PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 207, at 771 (citing In re Benrus Watch Co.,
352 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1965); See In re Book of the Month Club, 202 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.
1952)).
217
FALLOWS, supra note 3.
218
Id. at 17.
219
The Pew Study’s seventeen percent number may actually be underinclusive because it only addresses the number of people who are unaware of search engine’s
practice of including sponsored results. Their data does not incorporate the portion
of the public who are aware of the practice, but unaware of where those results appear.
220
The reasonable consumer is the modern guidepost for judicial analysis of an
FTC finding of deception. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 207, at 777–81.
221
WEBSTER’S, supra note 70, at 1843.
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222

tances itself from its advertisers. Distancing oneself from his copy is
not consistent with the actions of a newspaper editor, who traditionally stands by (vouches for) his stories. Therefore, Google, by its own
actions, acts not like a newspaper editor but like a disinterested compiler of advertisements, and full First Amendment protection is unwarranted and unnecessary. Regardless of whether the FTC chooses
to present direct evidence of deception, or whether they proceed
with their discretionary authority to regulate under the “likely to deceive” doctrine, the FTC could confidently assert jurisdiction over
223
Google.
Another framework under which the FTC could pursue regulation of Google is the deception by omission analysis. In order for an
224
omission to be misleading the speaker must omit a material fact.
As stated by Pridgen and Alderman, omissions may arise from the
“ordinary consumer’s assumptions about a product that are simply
225
not corrected by the advertisement.” The closest test for materiality
under the FTC act appears in 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1), which states that
an omission is material if “the extent to which the advertisement fails
to reveal facts material in the light of such representations or material
with respect to consequences which may result . . . under such condi226
The FTC has illuminated various
tions as are customary or usual.”
instances where there is a presumption of deception by omission.
The most pertinent for Google is the presumption of deception that
is created when there is an omission as to the nature of the product.
The FTC and the courts have construed deception as to the “nature of the product” quite liberally. A non-exhaustive list of various
rules concerning nature of the product deception includes labeling
227
as to the size of sleeping bags, labeling indicating that a seat belt is
228
not actually composed of leather, labeling as to the length of an ex229
230
tended ladder, and labeling disclosing the size of a tablecloth. By
222

Google, Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., C-03-5340, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 32450, *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007).
223
FTC findings of deception are sufficient for the agency to exert regulation over
an advertiser. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. “Moreover, uncontradicted
evidence of experts or consumers that there was no actual deception in particular
cases has been deemed insufficient to overcome the Commission’s conclusion that
there was a tendency or capacity to deceive.” PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 207,
at 771.
224
J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
225
PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 207, at 880–81.
226
15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (2000).
227
16 C.F.R. § 400 (1985).
228
Id. § 405.
229
Id. § 481.
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analogy, the aforementioned regulations are miniscule in potential
detriment to the consumer when compared to Google’s failure to
231
adequately disclose which search results are sponsored.
Finally,
each of these regulations could be characterized as forced speech.
Such regulation would be unconstitutional but for the fact that the
rule is imposed upon a commercial speaker. Having already established that Google’s AdWords program is best classified as commer232
cial speech, the next analytical step is to examine whether requiring Google to “label” its search engine results would survive a
Constitutional challenge under the commercial speech doctrine.
B. Eliminating Restraints on Competition Is Always a Substantial
Governmental Interest
Sinclair proposes a three-fold regulation requiring search engines to make clear disclosures of its sponsored results. First, Sinclair
suggested that search engines should be required to clearly state that
233
sponsored results are “paid listings.”
Second, paid listings should
234
Finally,
be colorfully and spatially separated from unpaid listings.
paid listings should have at least one other identifiable difference
235
from unpaid listings.
Should the FTC choose to promulgate and
enforce similar disclosure rules upon search engines, this section
seeks to provide the agency with the legal doctrine upon which it may
rely.
Turning toward the Central Hudson framework, the Unites States
Supreme Court in that case addressed the issue of whether the New
York Public Service Commission (Commission) violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendment by completely banning promotional adver236
tising by an electrical utility (Utility).
In 1973, the State of New
York faced a severe energy shortage, and sought to address the issue
by limiting a Utility’s ability to induce consumers into purchasing
electrical services—“[a]ny increase in demand for electricity . . .
237
In confronting this quesmeans greater consumption of energy.”
tion, the Court applied a four-factor test to determine whether the
230

Id. § 404.
See supra text accompanying notes 159–71.
232
Supra Part IV.
233
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
234
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
235
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
236
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 558
(1980).
237
Id. at 568.
231
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Commission’s regulation of advertising passed constitutional mus238
ter.
By applying the “commonsense” distinction between speech
“proposing a commercial transaction . . . and other varieties of
239
speech” which assumedly provide the speaker with more, or perhaps less, constitutional protection, the Court concluded that the
240
Utility’s advertising proposed a commercial transaction.
The Court reasoned that for speech proposing a commercial
transaction to merit First Amendment protection, it must neither
241
concern unlawful activity nor be misleading.
Second, the Court
must determine “whether the asserted governmental interest is sub242
stantial.”
Third, if the answers to the foregoing questions “yield
243
positive answers,” then the Court will address whether “the regula244
tion directly advances the governmental interest asserted.”
Finally,
the Court must assess whether the regulation is “not more extensive
245
than is necessary to serve that interest.”
The threshold issue for Google would be whether Google’s
speech—its “opinion” on a matter of public concern materialized as
placing advertising on its search page—is misleading. There is an astonishing absence of case law that upholds a speech restriction because the commercial speech in question was misleading. However,
there is at least a compelling argument that Google’s AdWords are
misleading. While it is easy to conceptualize a situation where an advertiser can mislead by making blatantly false statements in its advertising campaign, the argument becomes more nuanced—and perhaps too tenuous—in the context of Google’s AdWords. The FTC
would have to argue that Google, by not clearly delineating between
its sponsored results and its organic results, misleads consumers of
the third party product. This argument is thin because Google is not
the actual advertiser, even though its speech is commercial. Google’s
status as a commercial speaker in this instance does not arise through
its own advertising campaign; it arises because Google supplies editorial control over the advertising of others. This fact makes it difficult
to characterize Google’s speech as more likely to be misleading than
informative. Thus, Google’s speech is likely misleading for the pur238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245

Id. at 567–71.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 564.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 564.
Id.
Id.
Id.

CANNON

(final)

2009]

2/7/2009 12:22:41 PM

COMMENT

327

poses of section 5 of the FTC Act, but it is not “misleading” within the
context of a rigorous Central Hudson analysis, which, if satisfied, would
246
allow regulation of the speech provided there is a rational basis.
While Google’s AdWords may have a propensity to deceive under the
FTC Act, it is unlikely to be “misleading” under Central Hudson. Further, there is no indication whatsoever that AdWords concerns illegal
activity. Therefore, Google’s AdWords is entitled to some form of
First Amendment protection, requiring the reviewing court to next
inquire whether the asserted government action is substantial.
In determining substantiality, a court could easily analogize Goo247
gle’s speech to Turner Broadcasting where the Supreme Court found
the following important governmental interests: “(1) [p]reserving the
benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting
the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of
sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for televi248
sion programming.”
Likewise, “[t]he judgment of the legislative
branch cannot be ignored or undervalued simply because [those
sought to be regulated] casts its claims under the umbrella of the
249
Under Turner the Court further reasoned that
First Amendment.”
“assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information
250
sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order.” As shown
in Part I of this Comment, by empirical data, and by various other
commentators, the search engine market teeters on monopoly at the
most serious end of the spectrum, or is a clearly actualized oligopoly
at best. Indeed, “the Government’s interest in eliminating restraints
on fair competition is always substantial, even when the individuals or
entities subject to particular regulations are engaged in expressive ac251
tivity protected by the First Amendment.”
Regardless of whether a
reviewing court justifies FTC regulation under an economic or an informational rationale, the Government likely has a substantial interest in regulating Google’s AdWords program.
The next inquiry pursuant to Central Hudson is whether FTC
regulation of AdWords directly advances the Government’s interest
in protecting fair competition in a market whose commodity is
speech. The appropriate test is whether the proposed regulation will
246

Id.
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
248
Id.
249
Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973).
250
Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 663.
251
Id. (citing Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 324 U.S. 143 (1951)) (emphasis
added).
247
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advance the Government’s goal to “a material degree.” In defining
Rhode Island’s evidentiary burden, the Court determined that when
defending a regulation limiting lawful and truthful liquor price advertising, the state must show the “advertising ban will significantly re253
duce alcohol consumption.”
Rhode Island was unsuccessful in
showing that banning liquor advertisements containing price would
“mitigate competition and maintain prices at a higher level than
254
would prevail in a completely free market.” While the Court noted
that the state’s justification was a reasonable assumption with which it
agreed, the state failed to meet its evidentiary burden in proving the
255
assumption.
Further, 44 Liquormart struck down a ban on commercial speech
because “bans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech . . .
usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that the public will re256
Google’s AdWords program is
spond ‘irrationally’ to the truth.”
distinguishable from the ban in 44 Liquormart because the FTC would
not regulate on the assumption that the public is incapable of rationally responding to the truth. Quite to the contrary, by forcing Google
to disclose sponsored results the Government seeks not to protect
consumers from themselves, but to protect consumers from potentially exploitative advertising practices. The presupposition that
Google would potentially give the wrong impression as to the relevancy of its search results is far more palatable from a First Amendment perspective than the assumption that consumers are fundamentally irrational.
The question therefore becomes whether forcing Google to
make unambiguous disclosures of sponsorship within its search results will significantly reduce consumer confusion. The FTC must
also show that a reduction in consumer confusion will protect fair
competition in the search engine market by ensuring “widespread
257
dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources.”
As indicated by the Pew Study, one out of every six Internet
search engine users are unable to distinguish between sponsored and
258
non-sponsored results.
In every instance where a consumer clicks
on a sponsored result thinking it is an objectively accurate result, the
252
253
254
255
256
257
258

44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 503.
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
Supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
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user is confused and misled by the advertisement. A complete disclosure of result sponsorship will significantly reduce the aggregate
259
amount of confusion, and will likely eliminate confusion amongst
consumers who are unable to differentiate between Google’s advertising machine and its organic results. The question of whether this reduction in confusion is substantial will likely turn on an issue of fact.
But given the substantial number of bewildered searchers, a reduction by disclosure is likely significant either in the aggregate or on an
individual basis; however, as this is a question of empirics, it requires
further study.
The connection between reduction in the amount of consumer
confusion and the government’s interest in ensuring widespread dissemination of information from a variety of sources is best illustrated
by a hypothetical. Suppose Judovin LLC (J) and Goldberg Corporation (G) are both engaged in the sale of handmade soaps, and both
solely do business on the Internet. G manufactures an astonishing
variety of soaps, but at a lower quality than J, who manufactures the
finest organic lavender soap in the land. G, an organization of dubious ethics, purchases, among other things, the following AdWords:
“handmade lavender soap,” and “Judovin.” J does not purchase AdWords. Under the current regime, for a consumer who enters the
search terms “Judovin” and “handmade soap” or “lavender,” the first
result on Google would be a link to G’s webpage, and a consumer
who expects to purchase high quality J soap will be presented with
260
Bethe option to purchase lower quality and lower priced G soap.
cause the consumer did not receive the information he sought, he
may never have the opportunity to make an informed choice as to the
soap he ultimately purchases. Furthermore, G may have the ability to
charge supercompetitive prices or prevent new market entry through
its use of AdWords and the concomitant reverse free-riding rational
259

The aggregate confusion is reduced by the ratio of the sum of the number of
users who cannot distinguish sponsored results and the number of times each confused user is misled by the sponsored results to the overall volume of search engine
use.
260
While there may be a trademark remedy for initial interest confusion on the
set of facts as presented, the issue is as of yet undecided. See, e.g., Google, Inc. v.
American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., C-03-5340, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450,
*8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007). Because Judovin is likely a generic mark, this Comment
assumes the mark has not achieved the secondary meaning necessary to warrant
trademark protection, and the trademark issue is therefore moot. Even if a trademark remedy were available, such a remedy would merely represent piecemeal gapfilling and would only protect the interests of the trademark holder. Likewise, a
trademark remedy does not provide predictable consumer protection, nor would it
forward the Government’s interest in ensuring a diversity of information.
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261

described above.
While the aforementioned micro-scenario is
clearly whimsical, the impact such practice would have on a macro
level is significant and ultimately beyond the FTC’s current regulatory
262
Requiring clear disclosure of sponsored results will reduce
reach.
consumer confusion and, by giving consumers the ability to make an
informed choice as to whether they wish to view advertising or objectively reliable results, thereby ensure diversity of information and protect a market whose commodity is speech.
The final inquiry under Central Hudson is whether the proposed
regulation is not more extensive than is necessary. The only way for
the government to forward its substantial interest in reducing consumer confusion and promoting a diversity of information is to require sponsorship disclosure. One arena where regulation by forced
disclosure served to ensure diversity of information is the payola
263
In response to the practice of radio stations
scandal of the 1950’s.
accepting money from artists to play their songs on the air, Congress
264
enacted 47 U.S.C. § 317, which states:
all matter broadcast by any radio station for which any money,
service or other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly
paid, or promised to or charged or accepted by, the station so
broadcasting, from any person, shall, at the time the same is so
broadcast, be announced as paid for or furnished, as the case may
265
be, by such person.

The rationale for this legislation was to decrease barriers for new art266
By attempting to ensure objective
ists wishing access to the radio.
popularity as the benchmark for radio play, Congress protected consumer’s rights to hear a diversity of music. The assumption upon
which § 317 rests is that the only way consumers will know they are
being presented with sponsored material is to require the recipient of
267
the consideration to disclose the transaction to the consumers.
261

See supra notes 159–71 and accompanying text.
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act grants the FTC authority to
regulate unfair and deceptive acts. 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (2000). While the FTC may
have a course of action against G, under the current state of affairs the FTC would
not be able to limit Google’s ability to sell AdWords to predatory purchasers because
Google is not in competition with G. See id.
263
See generally Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 26 (offering a discussion of potential Federal Communications Commission jurisdiction over Google).
264
47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (2000).
265
Id.
266
Sarah Greene, Legislative Update: Clear Channel v. Competition Act of 2002: Is There
a Clear End in Sight?, 12 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 387, 426 (2002).
267
See In re Nat’l Broad. Co., 27 F.C.C. 2d 75, 75 (1970) (“The purpose of Section
317 of the Act . . . is to require that the audience be clearly informed that it is hear262
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In an auditory medium, requiring the disc jockey to announce
that a certain song was paid for is the only way to communicate the
necessary information to consumers. Google’s results page, being a
visual medium, requires a far more difficult and nuanced solution to
the problem of whether the regulation is more expansive than is necessary. Are differences in color between organic and sponsored re268
Is color in combination with
sults sufficient to alert consumers?
269
“paid listing” effective?
Would the requirement of a discretionary
third category adequately inform consumers that their results are
merely advertising? There are no clear answers without a scientific
study that finds the balance between what is necessary to promote diversity of information and what is unconstitutional forced speech.
This Comment, while advocating for Governmental regulation of
search engine practices, therefore cautions the FTC to conduct a
consumer study before exacting any rules upon Google.
C. Is Regulating Google a Wise Policy Choice?
Even though the FTC possesses regulatory jurisdiction over Google’s deceptive practices and such governance is not constitutionally
impermissible, FTC rules may nonetheless be an unwise policy
choice. This Comment, even if it could, seeks to do no harm to
Google. Google is a tremendous business, which operates at the forefront of technology and provides the public with an invaluable service. Google is not evil; to the contrary, it is generally beneficent.
For example, it provides its programmers with the funding necessary
to carry out the programmers’ personal projects and requires that
twenty percent of the programmer’s time be devoted to individual,
270
This Comment does however assert that
non-Google projects.
Google occupies a critical seat in our society. Much to humanity’s
dismay, Google is ultimately a business that potentially harbors objectives and incentives antithetical to the common good. FTC regulation of Google’s AdWords would not undermine the service Google
provides; it would enhance and affirm the sacrosanct societal values
of free speech, informational reliability, and free-market enterprise.
ing or viewing matter which has been paid for, when such is the case, and that the
person paying for the broadcast of the matter be clearly identified.”).
268
This question is most likely answered in the negative as Google currently and
voluntarily uses color to distinguish between categories of results, yet consumers are
still confused.
269
Again, Google voluntarily uses spatial and textual devices to distinguish, yet
confusion abounds.
270
Stephen Baker, Google and the Wisdom of Clouds, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 13, 2007,
at 32.
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Nor would FTC regulation decrease Google’s economic value. With
their deftness at placing Internet advertising, requiring the entire
search engine market to clearly disclose sponsored results will not
turn advertisers away from Google. The regulation will protect the
information market from slipping into a reality mitigated by advertising—the simplified operational mode. We should demand complexity, accuracy, and fair competition in our speech markets. However,
there is currently insufficient data that would indicate a present need
for immediate action. Future regulation is undoubtedly prudent, but
hasty action may lead to unintended consequences. The greatest disservice the government could do to our informational nodes is regulate them into oblivion. Without a profit, there is no incentive to
provide the service. While the requirement of clear disclosure is only
a small step towards ensuring informational diversity and autonomy,
the FTC should remember that discretion is sometimes the better
part of valor—but it only took one day for the Library of Alexandria
to burn to the ground.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Internet has the potential to be what our collective unconscious imagined: a truly democratic society that satisfies niche market
consumers and mainstream tastes alike. However, the First Amendment assumption that the only way to promote a democracy is by
permitting speakers unfettered editorial control dissipates in the online arena. While we should not abandon this assumption through
piecemeal First Amendment exceptions, we should thoughtfully apply existing doctrine to new modes of speech. The Google gatekeeper, motivated purely by economic interests, should not have unregulated control and exclusionary power over our age’s most
precious nodes of communication. Conversely, Internet consumers,
at times both naïve and loyal, are susceptible to confusing “relevancy”
with “accuracy,” especially when misled by the Google advertising
machine. Further, this confusion may lead to an unknown and unknowable decline in the quality of information presented to information consumers. Regulation of Google’s deceptive advertising practices will increase the relevance of search results and thereby ensure
that searchers are more likely than not to find what they are looking
for. As a society dependent on the Internet for making decisions
from the most trivial to the most pivotal, we must demand relevance
in search engine results. By encouraging responsible behavior from
those entities that dominate and disseminate the information upon
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which we all rely, we ensure diversity, dependability, and protect the
Internet from re-forming itself into a simplified operational mode.

